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Abstract:   
 
 
  This article critiques neoliberal transition theory from a neoclassical sociological 
perspective. Neoliberals argue that postcommunist economic failure is the result of 
inadequate adherence to neoliberal precepts. This paper argues that the neoliberal policy 
package of “Shock Therapy” (consisting of the radical transition to a market economy 
through rapid and extensive price and trade liberalization, stringent monetary and fiscal 
stabilization, and the implementation of a mass privatization program) creates severe 
supply-and-demand shocks for enterprises, inducing firm failure. This leads to a fiscal 
crisis for the state, and an erosion of its capacity and bureaucratic character. This in turn 
reacts back on the enterprise sector, since the state can no longer support the institutions 
necessary for the effective functioning of capitalist economies. The neoliberal theory is 
tested against a neoclassical sociological theory by examining the experience of 12 
postcommunist countries and two reform Asian communist countries.   1
At the onset of the transition from state socialism to market capitalism, Western-
trained economists provided the postcommunist power elite with the blueprint for 
constructing capitalism amid the ruins of communism (Stark 1992). They created the 
Shock Therapy policy package, which, when implemented, devastated the postcommunist 
economy and weakened the state. A review of the economic history of postcommunist 
countries demonstrates that “the market” provided no protection for firms during the 
insertion of postcommunist economies into the global capitalist system, ushering in de-
industrialization and impoverishment. 
  Shock Therapy was, above all else, a Smithian analysis: a successful transition to 
capitalism could be accomplished by relying on the powers of the invisible hand, 
unleashed by radical curtailment of the state’s involvement in the economy. In Sachs’s 
words, “Markets spring up as soon as central planning bureaucrats vacate the field” 
(1994: xii). Whenever politically possible, “the market mechanism” would accomplish 
the tasks that, in the 1960s, most would have expected to be performed by a 
developmental state. 
Where neoliberal reforms were not modified by policy reversals caused by voter 
backlash, the consequences were severe. The de-modernization of much of the 
postcommunist world is clear from Table 1.  
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Table 1: Economic Performance in Postcommunist Society 
 
 Avg. 
GDP Per 
Capita 
Change 
1991-
2000 
(in 1995 
US$) 
Change in 
Male Life 
Expectancy 
1989-2000 
(value in 
2000) 
% of 
Population 
Below 
Poverty 
l993-1995 
(in 1987-
88) 
% Exper. 
Shortage 
of Food 
&/or 
Clothes 
2000 (in 
1989) 
% Age-
Appropriate 
in Kinder-
garten 1996 
(change 
from 1989) 
FDI Net 
Inflow 
Per 
Capita 
1990-
2000  
(BoP 
data in 
current 
US$)  
Czech   0.1  +3 (71.5)  1(0) NA  89  (-1)  $2,271 
Slovakia  0.4  +2 (69.1)  1(0)  15.8 (6.5)  75 (-17)  $777  
Poland  3.7  +2 (71.6)  20 (6)  25.7 (7.7)  47 (-2)  $1,053 
Hungary  1.3  +2 (67.1)  4 (1)  18.3 
(12.5) 
87 (-1)  $2106 
Slovenia  1.9  +3 (71.6)  1 (0)  NA  65 (-7)  $856 
C.E.E. 
Avg.  
1.2 +2.4  5.4    73  (-5.6)  $1,413 
Russia  -3.5  -5 (59.0)  50 (2)  73.0 
(45.1) 
55 (-14)  $141 
Belarus  -0.5  -3 (62.5)  22 (1)  NA  64 (+1)  $124 
Ukraine  -7.1  -5 (63.0)  63 (2)  NA  41 (-20)  $69 
FSU 
Avg. 
-3.7 -4.3  45    53  (-11)  $111 
Kazakh.   -2.5  -4 (60.3)  65 (5)  NA  24 (-31)  $524 
Uzbek.   -2.0  +1(66.7)  63 (25)  NA  24 (-10)  $38 
CAFSU 
Avg. 
-2.3 -1.5  64    24  (-21.5)  $281 
Romania  -1.8  -1 (66.1)  59 (6)  43.9 
(26.2) 
55 (-8)  $292 
Bulgaria  -1.4  -1 (65.1)  15 (2)  55.1 
(45.7) 
69 (0)  $403 
E. Eur. 
Avg. 
-1.6 -1  37    62  (-4) $348 
China 9.0  +2  (68.6)  NA  NA  NA  $255 
Vietnam 5.5  +4  (66.7)  NA  NA  NA  $190 
E. Asian 
Avg. 
7.3 +3        $223 
 
SP (Shock Privatization) = Privatized at least 25% of large SOEs under a mass privatization program 
within two years. 
SL (Shock Liberalization) = Liberalized at least 75% of imports and domestic prices within two years. 
SS (Shock Stabilization) = Implemented an IMF approved stabilization package. 
 
GDP and life-expectancy data from World Bank Development Indicators 2001 (CD-ROM); poverty rates 
from Branko Milanovic. Income, Inequality and Poverty During the Transition from Planned to Market 
Economy. (Washington, DC.: The World Bank, 1998); kindergarten enrollments from Human 
Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS 1999: 58 (Bratislava: United Nations 
Development Program); food and clothing deprivation from Kligman and Szelenyi (2002). Policy data 
from historical summaries.  
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Outside of Central Eastern Europe and East Asia reform communism, economic 
performance has been disastrous. Economic output has declined dramatically, and 
poverty rates have skyrocketed. Extreme poverty, as measured by a survey that asked 
respondents if they had recently gone to bed hungry because of lack of food and if they 
lacked adequate clothing, is startlingly high. A full 73% of Russian respondents said they 
either had gone to bed hungry recently and/or had inadequate clothing. This is consistent 
with the amazingly rapid decline in male life expectancy at birth. By the year 2000 Male 
life expectancy in Russia was a full five years lower than it was 10 years ago, only 59.0 
years, significantly lower than in China (68.64) and even in Vietnam (66.70). 
  The rest of this paper is divided into two sections. In the first, the competing 
theoretical claims of the neoliberals’ Shock Therapy approach is contrasted with a 
neoclassical sociological approach. The second presents comparative evidence on the 
economic performance of the postcommunist world which is consistent with the 
sociological position and inconsistent with the neoliberal position. The punch line is that 
the key “switching point” (see Weber 1978) in the brief history of postcommunism was 
the decision to pursue Shock Therapy -- and especially all three components -- within a 
relatively brief period. These policies, when carried out in the absence of large-scale 
foreign direct investment and/or cooperative production arrangements with 
multinationals, “derails” the postcommunist transition on the way to Western European-
style capitalism.  
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Neo-Smithian Transition Theory  
The restructuring of the postcommunist economies along capitalist lines was 
intended to be guided by market forces, plain and simple. The IMF and the World Bank 
no longer tolerated the developmental state as they did in the 1960s and 1970s. In its 
place, the “market” would restructure firms and thus economies. Neoliberal academics 
and experts argued that, by allowing the market to work its magic, a new efficient set of 
organizations would replace the deformed inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
inherited from socialism (Sachs 1991: 3; see also Sachs 1996; Frydman, Gray, and 
Rapaczynski 1996; Kosolowski 1992; Lipton and Sachs 1990; Fischer and Gelb 1991; 
Blanchard et al. 1993: 10-11; Carlin, Reenen, and Wolfe 1994: 72; see also Spenner et al. 
1998). The notion of pursuing an industrial policy, let alone relying on SOEs to 
spearhead development, “flies in the face of everything we know about the behavior of 
states around the world” (Frydman, Rapaczynski, and Turkewitz 1997: 85).  
The “big-bang” or Shock Therapy policies shared the neoclassical economic 
assumption of atomized, rational actors without systematic information deficiencies.
2 
Once the incentive structure was correct, everything else would follow (see Murrell 1993; 
Gowan 1995). As Vaclav Klaus, the architect of the Czech transition and the chief 
spokesperson for neoliberalism in the region in the first half of the 1990s, stated, 
“[C]reating the conditions for the market to work and for private institutions to flourish 
can accomplish the economic and the social transformation ... [people will] change their 
patterns of behavior and ... adjust their activities rationally and voluntarily if the market 
provides the right incentives” (quoted in Blejer and Coricelli 1995: 100).    5
The neoliberals planned to let the market work by freeing up prices and allowing 
foreign firms to compete in the domestic economy. Given these “true” price signals, and 
a stable economic environment created by stabilization (i.e., austerity) programs, the 
Smithian private actors created by privatization would utilize resources in such a way as 
to maximize efficiency, and quickly establish a growth trajectory based on each country’s 
“comparative advantage.” By allowing the invisible hand to guide restructuring, Eastern 
Europe would quickly catch up with the West or, as Sachs puts it, experience a 
“democratically based rise in living standards” (Sachs 1994: 25). 
This Smithian transition strategy won the day: “the majority of countries in the 
former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe adopted what can best be 
described as shock therapy or the big bang approach …” (UNDP 1999: 30). This was 
“the most dramatic episode of economic liberalization in economic history” (Murrell 
1996: 31), “a landslide victory of the neoliberal project” (Greskovits 1998: 22-23). Of 
course, things haven’t turned out the way the neoliberals thought they would, as all but 
the most outlandishly Panglossian takes on the Former Soviet Union (FSU) see it as an 
unmitigated disaster.  
The neoliberal explanation for the obvious failure of Russia and other 
postcommunist countries is that they did not adequately implement the Shock Therapy 
package. A failure to stabilize (Åslund, Boone, and Johnson 1996; de Melo, Denizer, and 
Gelb 1996; Fisher, Sahay, and Vegh 1996; Sachs and Warner 1996; Sachs 1997) and to 
carry out price and trade-liberalization policies (de Melo and Gelb 1996; Selowsky and 
Martin 1997) were identified as causes of poor performance. In addition, poor outcomes 
were explained by the corrupt behavior of elites and the maintenance of public finance   6
(Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer 1997). Indeed, this is the position taken in the official 
publications of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (see EBRD 1999). For some neoliberal observers, failures are the result not 
of bad policies but of the “cronyism” that is seen as implicitly endogenous to a nation’s 
culture. 
I start from a neoclassical sociological position, building on the Marxian and 
Weberian understandings of capitalism. In this tradition, successful capitalist 
development requires not just markets but capitalist social-property rights (see Brenner 
1986) and a strong bureaucratic state (see Weber 1978; Evans and Rauch 1999). From 
this perspective, the radically anti-statist Shock Therapy package does more harm than 
good, because it weakens the state. As a result, it was precisely the Shock Therapy 
policies implemented by neoliberals that resulted in the de-modernization and 
impoverishment of large parts of the postcommunist world. Although neoliberals are 
correct in their view that “corruption” is intimately connected to economic activity in 
postcommunist society, in many important ways this corruption is a by-product of Shock 
Therapy itself, as will be explained below. In my sociological analysis, corruption is a 
by-product of the transformation of the bureaucratic state into a patrimonial one, in which 
personalistic networks permeate the state, and the separation of the officeholder from the 
office becomes blurred. 
Of course, other factors contribute to postcommunist performance. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) confers enormous advantages in terms of securing investment capital, 
technology transfer, and access to Western markets (see King 2000; 2001a, 2001b; King 
and Varadi 2002).
3 From the neoclassical sociological position, this is likely stemming   7
from the fact that MNCs “transplant” capitalist social-property relations in the host 
country.
4 Those countries in the postcommunist world which have been able to avoid a 
Russian-style debacle and resume growth trajectories have been able to do this because 
their firms managed to insert themselves into global networks producing high value-
added manufactured goods. So far, central Eastern Europe and Estonia have been able to 
avoid the fate of the Soviet Union only because of Western investments and co-
production agreements. This position is not unique to the neoclassical sociological 
position, since many neoliberals are also boosters of FDI.  
Another factor that is important in explaining the variation in growth of 
postcommunist economies from the neoclassical sociological position is the “advantage 
of lateness,” or the initial level of development; in particular, the extent of 
industrialization. The advantage of switching resources from low-productivity traditional 
agriculture to a system of rural industry provides enormous one-time gains in labor 
productivity, since human muscle is greatly multiplied when put to work on machines. 
Conversely, once industrialization has been completed, more developed countries should 
have a greater stock of human capital and more developed infrastructure, and therefore 
should have an advantage in global markets relative to less developed societies. Table 2 
provides data on some “initial conditions” of countries in the postcommunist world. 
Again, although there is some disagreement with the neoliberal camp, most neoliberal 
economists would agree with this position.  
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Table 2: Initial Conditions 
 
 Population 
1989 
(millions) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
1990 in 
constant 
1995 
US$ 
% Empl. in 
Agriculture  
1989 
Trade 
with 
CMEA 
as % 
GDP 
1990 
External 
Debt 1989 
Per Capita 
current 
US$ 
% Age-
Appropriate 
in Kinder- 
garten 1989 
Czech   10  $5,270  12  6.0%  $636  90 
Slovakia 5  $4,048  13  6.0%  $365  92 
Poland 38  $2,990  25  8.4% $1,134  49 
Hungary 10  $4,857  19  13.7% $2,040  86 
Slovenia 2  $9,659  11  4.0%  NA  72 
            
Russia 148  $3,666  14  11.1%  $364  69 
Belarus 10  $3,057 22  41.0%  NA  65 
Ukraine 52  $1,969 19  23.8%  $11  61 
            
Kazakh.   16  $1,995 22  20.8%  $2  55 
Uzbek.   20  $611  39  25.5%  $3  34 
            
Romania 23  $1,702  28  16.8% $473  63 
Bulgaria 9  $1,716  19  16.1% $1,126  69 
            
China 1,119  $349 60  2.3%  $40  NA 
Vietnam 65  $206  75  15.0% $319  NA 
 
For % in agriculture, Czech Republic, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan data is for 1990. For Slovakia and 
Vietnam, data is for 1991, and for Slovenia data is for 1993. 
For debt, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan data is for 1992, Ukraine data is for 1993. 
Source: Population, GDP, agriculture, and external-debt data from World Bank 2001. CMEA trade data 
from De Melo et al. 2001. Kindergarten data from UNDP 1999. Policy data from historical summaries. 
 
 
The Neoclassical Sociological Theory of the Transition to Capitalism in 
Postcommunist Society: Shock Therapy as Generating De-Modernization 
Whereas the neoliberals advocate Shock Therapy, including the rapid 
privatization of large state-owned enterprises (SOE), the sociological theory of transition 
posits that these policies will create supply-and-demand shocks that devastate the 
financial position of postcommunist firms. These firms are subsequently unable to 
restructure themselves to be competitive on international markets or the liberalized 
domestic market. As output declines, so do taxes, creating a severe fiscal crisis of the 
state, which in turn leads to the weakening of its bureaucratic character and the erosion of   9
its support for the institutions that are necessary for modern capitalist development. The 
result is a system of capitalist property relations (albeit with a significant non-capitalist 
sphere) without a bureaucratic state. Rather than locking in “market reforms,” the 
neoliberal policy package managed to lock in a type of capitalism that produces de-
modernization. In other words, Shock Therapy induced a new equilibrium -- one that is 
incapable of generating significant investment and thus dynamic growth, and instead 
brings about an “involutionary” outcome (Burawoy 1996). 
 
The Three Shocks 
  The negative shocks to the domestic economy which follow rapid liberalization of 
prices and foreign trade, as well as the shock associated with the austerity of 
“stabilization” programs, have been extensively discussed by critics of the Washington 
Consensus (the most prominent is Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz 2002; see also Gowan 
1995, 1999; Andor and Summers 1998; Chussodovsky 1997; Amsden, Kochanowicz, and 
Taylor 1994; UNDP 1999: 29). Rapid price deregulation, given the often monopolistic 
structure of Soviet-style economies, will lead to a rapid increase in the prices of inputs, 
creating an enormous supply shock as producers are unable to afford adequate levels of 
necessary inputs. In addition, the wholesale liberalization of imports created a large drop 
in aggregate demand for domestic producers, since they now faced global competitors -- 
some were more technologically advanced, and others had cheaper labor.  
The shock that accompanies the fiscal and monetary austerity of “stabilization” 
packages is also well documented. With tight money, government subsidies cut, and   10
credit dramatically more expensive, most firms run into severe cash-flow problems and a 
shortage of capital for investments and even day-to-day operations.  
There was also the devastating shock resulting from the political destruction of 
the old Warsaw Pact CMEA (or COMECON) trading system. For many states, a vast 
majority of exports and imports were from the former CMEA, accounting for a huge 
amount of economic activity, as shown in Table 2. The breakdown of this trading system 
therefore disrupted supply chains and created a gigantic loss of markets.  
In addition to these shocks, this paper adds the shocks resulting from large-scale 
privatization, a pillar of the neoliberal package which is not often directly criticized. My 
neoclassical sociological account of privatization distinguishes between two different 
types: that of small enterprises and that of large and medium-sized enterprises. The rapid 
privatization of small and some medium-sized businesses is beneficial, because it 
provides a superior incentive structure for those in control of these enterprises. Large 
SOEs, however, cannot be privatized rapidly without unacceptable costs. King has 
refered to the neoliberal policy of rapid privatization of large enterprises via mass 
privatization techniques as “shock privatization” (2003). Shock privatization creates 
severe direct and indirect supply-and-demand shocks for enterprises.
5 Most important, 
shock privatization means that the resulting private corporation will not have an owner or 
owners with sufficient resources to restructure the company. This is, of course, a 
consequence of attempting to “make capitalism without capitalists” (Eyale, Szelenyi, and 
Townsley 1998), and is probably the single biggest negative effect of shock privatization.  
A typical large postcommunist firm, when it begins its life as a privatized enterprise, will 
face the devastating crises induced by the destruction of the CMEA trading system, as   11
well as stabilization and liberalization shocks. Without any capital to carry out 
desperately needed restructuring, and without the injection of any new managerial talent, 
many firms found themselves in untenable positions. It is only logical that owners, 
managers, and workers, unable to work cooperatively through the firm to better their 
common cause, would look to find solutions to their personal problems -- in this case, 
their quest to accumulate wealth and survive the transition. Shock privatization also 
frequently created outside owners with very poor arrangements to monitor firm managers 
or even to monitor other (typically inside) owners. This was virtually inevitable, since 
there was almost none of the enormous business infrastructure (Elson 1991), or the 
protection of shareholder rights, that help “make markets” in advanced capitalist systems. 
The combination of these two conditions led to large amounts of asset stripping in the 
postcommunist economy, wreaking havoc on the functioning of many firms. This is a 
paradox from the neoliberal perspective: while involving the state in the economy is 
allegedly a recipe for rent-seeking behavior, not involving the state in the transition 
creates an environment that encourages corruption (see King 2001a, 2001b).  
All of these effects combine to create newly privatized firms that were unable to 
carry out desperately needed restructuring (they had often experienced a long period of 
decline or had never been modernized). Not only could these firms not afford to 
meaningfully restructure; they also suffered from severe financial crises. Firms responded 
in a number of ways. First, there was a huge decrease in paid wages, made primarily 
through arrears but also through payment in kind. Firms often resorted to providing 
workers with direct access to the means of subsistence (typically via garden plots and/or 
collective potato farming) as a means of keeping their workers (Southworth 2001; King   12
2002). As Table 3 shows, in 1999 many firms throughout the region still had wage 
arrears. Second, firms reduced their demand for inputs. This drop in demand was led by 
the drop in investments. As Table 3 also indicates, there was a huge decline in gross 
capital formation in constant dollars throughout the postcommunist world outside of 
Central Europe and East Asia. By the end of Russia’s mass privatization program in 
1994, investment was only 30% of its 1990 level. By 2000, it was a dismal 18% of its 
1990 level, the same level of decline as in Ukraine.  
  These three shocks -- swift and extensive liberalization, stabilization, and mass 
privatization -- all weaken firms. When these shocks overwhelm upstream producers of 
crucial industrial inputs, additional supply shocks occur for downstream industries. Many 
industrial-supply firms had developed what Williamson calls “asset specific knowledge”; 
that is, they produced goods with the special knowledge of the specific needs of their 
purchaser (Williamson 1975). These types of suppliers will be very difficult or 
impossible to replace in the short term. Even if the firm finds a replacement, it will 
probably be a foreign supplier, and the cost may well be prohibitive even if the firm has 
access to credit to finance the purchase. 
  These direct supply-and-demand shocks create additional shocks by weakening 
the state. As firms entered into financial crisis and technical bankruptcy, the first thing to 
go was often their payment of taxes, which at any rate were contracting along with the 
economy. In Russia, for example, receipts of the consolidated state budget declined from 
41% of GDP in 1990 to only 26.8% in 1997 (Vorobyov and Zhukov 2000: 5). This had 
the rather immediate and obvious effect of drastically reducing state orders from 
enterprises -- or, in many cases, the orders were maintained but the state stopped paying   13
(see King 2002). As Table 3 indicates, the decline in total government consumption is 
generalized throughout the postcommunist world outside of Central Europe and East 
Asia. This loss of sales revenues from the state constitutes another major demand shock 
for firms.  
  This loss of revenues, when combined with the anti-statist ideology of the 
neoliberals, quickly led to a lack of state support for the basic institutions that enable 
firms to successfully restructure by raising their quality and changing their product line 
so that they can compete in the world market. An important instance of this occurs when 
the state stops supporting the educational institutions that turn out skilled manpower, 
leading to a crisis for many firms. Of particular importance is the production of experts 
with scientific credentials by local polytechnic institutes. In only two years (from 1993 to 
1995), the number of technicians in R. & D. per million of the Russian population fell 
from 905 to 688, a drop of just under 24% (World Bank 1999). While some of this is 
brain drain, case-study data indicates that much is also the result of a shortage of new 
technicians (King 2002). Table 3 shows a measure of the decline of scientists during the 
1990s. Russia’s level fell by 19% from 1994 to 1999, after the biggest decline must 
already have occurred. Similarly, Ukraine’s level declined by a full 36% from 1995 to 
1999, after what also had to be enormous earlier declines. This decline in education 
affected not only institutions of higher learning but primary education as well, as 
indicated in the decline of the proportion of children attending kindergarten, which is 
reported in Table 1. Thus, it looks like the shortage of skilled manpower will only 
intensify in the future.    14
As a result of widespread financial crises, firms up and down commodity chains 
are unable to get the money or credit they need in order to continue production. Rather 
than go out of business, however, managers reactivate old “horizontal” ties (or generate 
new ones) to managers at other firms that functioned to compensate for the scarcity of 
inputs in the shortage economy (see Kornai 1980). These networks now function to aid in 
production, given the absence of money and credit in the new capitalist economy, and the 
network ties allow the firms to withdraw from the market through inter-enterprise arrears, 
debt-swaps, and barter (see David Woodruff [1990] for an outstanding account of these 
processes in Russia). Table 3 lists the extent of barter in 2000, based on a firm-level 
sample conducted by the World Bank and the EBRD. Barter decreases the efficiency of 
these transactions (because typically a middleman must be used), shields firms from 
market pressures (because business partners are based on network ties, not price 
considerations), and makes taxation highly problematic (because it makes it easy to 
conceal transactions from the state, since in-kind taxes, which are difficult and expensive 
to collect anyway, are easy to overvalue when they are paid).  
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Table 3: Firm Behavior and Restructuring 
 
 %  of 
Firms 
with at 
Least 
25% 
Turnover 
in Barter 
% of 
Firms 
with 
Overdue 
Wages 
1999 
Change in 
Gross Cap 
Formation 
1990-2000 
constant 
1995 US$ 
Change in 
Final Gov. 
Consumption 
1990-2000 
constant 1995 
US$ 
 Change in 
Scientists 
and 
Engineers 
in R. & D. 
per mill. 
1992-99
1 
Czech   2.7%  31.0%  +24% -23.0%  -32% 
Slovakia  20.0% 31.6% +39%  -2.7%  -15% 
Poland  21.8% 17.9% +92%  +16.7%  +19% 
Hungary  0.0% 4.8% +83%  +16.7%  +5% 
Slovenia  21.0% 22.6% +121%  +33.8%  -25% 
         
Russia  33.9% 36.8% -82%  -25.5%  -29% 
Belarus 15.1% 48.2% -82%  -19.3%  -30% 
Ukraine  31.8% 23.8% -46%  -27.2%  -26% 
         
Kazakh.   21.8%  29.5% -83%  -39.0%  NA 
Uzbek.   12.5% 33.3% NA  NA  NA 
         
Romania 7.2%  12.5%  -46%  +16.2%  NA 
Bulgaria  3.0% 8.1% -34%  -56.4%  -71% 
         
China  NA NA +184%  +166.1% +30% 
Vietnam  NA NA +455%  +78.0%  NA 
 
 
Change in scientists and engineers in Slovenia 1992-1998, Russia 1995-1999, Ukraine 1995-1999, Belarus 
1992-1996, China 1994-1996. Policy data from historical summaries presented below. Barter and wages 
from the World Bank’s BEEPS survey. Capital formation, government consumption, and scientist and 
engineer data from World Bank 2002 (CD-ROM). 
 
 
The loss of tax revenue from enterprise failure, exacerbated by the rise of hard-to-
tax barter, inevitably weakened the state. As the state was increasingly unable to meet its 
formal obligations, it began to break down. Poorly paid (or unpaid) state officials are 
easily corrupted, and the bureaucratic nature of the state decomposed. It became riddled 
by reactivated (as well as new) patron-client ties between government officials and 
businessmen. Private market success came to depend to a great extent on arbitrary 
political decisions and the exercise of private force.   16
It is notoriously difficult to provide a reliable and valid measure of the 
bureaucratic nature of the state or of state capacity. Table 4 provides several attempts at 
such measures. The EBRD Governance Indicator is a composite score ranging from 1 to 
3, taken from the World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey, that averages firms’ perceived hindrance resulting from microeconomic factors, 
macroeconomic factors, physical infrastructure, and law and order (EBRD 1999: 116). Of 
course, as will be argued below, we should use composite indicators with great caution. 
Still, this indicator represents something -- at the very least, the reported perceptions of 
the provision of infrastructural support and the bureaucratic nature of the state (it 
measures bureaucracy because it gets at the impersonal application of formal rules and 
regulations, and the separation of the office from the officeholder [Weber 1978]).
6  
Another measure is the tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, the idea being that a 
stronger state can extract more resources from society than a weaker state can. While 
longitudinal data on revenues would be best, the World Bank doesn’t report tax revenue 
for most transition states prior to 1994, and thus it is impossible to discern the change in 
revenues during the crucial period from the system change until 1994.
7 The security of 
property-rights values are taken from the World Bank’s World Business Environment 
Survey, which asked firms, “To what degree do you agree that the legal system will 
uphold contracts and property rights?” The score is the combined answers of “Strongly 
disagree” and “Disagree.” The higher the score, the lower the perceived bureaucratic 
nature of the state.  
Change over time in state capacity is also captured by the increase in registered 
total crimes: the argument being that a state with greater capacity can prevent or deter   17
more crime than a state with less capacity. However, crime rates are clearly very much a 
reflection of state capacity: in weaker states, fewer crimes will be recorded, and they are 
likely to be more serious and violent (UNDP 1999: 23). In a weak state like Russia, for 
example, “recorded crime in the federation might be no more than one quarter to one 
third of total crime” (UNDP 1999: 23). Thus, comparisons within regions (which are 
likely to have similar overall levels of state capacity) are more valid measures of state 
capacity than comparisons across regions. 
These indicators, while very far from perfect, give us some purchase on relative 
state capacity or strength of bureaucracy. A startling pattern in the data is that, in regional 
comparisons, those countries that implemented mass privatization programs had worse 
state capacity and less secure property rights than those which privatized in other ways. 
The major exception to this pattern is Russian crime rates, which are substantially below 
their true level.  
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Table 4: Measures of State Capacity, Security of Property Rights, and Mass 
Privatization Programs 
 
  Neoliberal 
Reforms 
SP/SL/SS 
Tax Rev. as 
% GDP 
1994 
% Above 
Regional 
Avg. Increase 
in Registered 
Total Crime 
1989-1996 
EBRD 
Governance 
Index (1-3) 
1999 
Insecure 
Property 
Rights  
1999 
Czech   SP/SL/SS  33 78  1.59 23.3 
Slovakia  SL/SS  35 (1996)  17  1.65  14.0 
Poland  SL/SS  35 -11  1.69 10.3 
Hungary  SL/SS  38  18  1.98 12.0 
Slovenia  SL/SS  39 -4.2  1.95 11.4 
         
Russia  SP/SL/SS  19 -17  1.16 41.6 
Belarus    33 3.2  1.57 30.4 
Ukraine  SP/SL/SS  22 (1999)  9.2  1.24  44.0 
         
Kazakh.   SP/SL/SS  14 (1997)  158  1.27  31.0 
Uzbek.     NA -60  1.83  9.6 
         
Romania  SP/SL/SS  26 32  1.07 21.6 
Bulgaria  SL/SS  30 -32  1.38 20.0 
         
China    8 NA NA 11.0 
Vietnam  SL/SS  19  NA NA NA 
 
SP (Shock Privatization) = Privatized at least 25% of large SOEs under a mass privatization program 
within two years. 
SL (Shock Liberalization) = Liberalized at least 75% of imports and domestic prices within two years. 
SS (Shock Stabilization) = Implemented an IMF approved stabilization package. 
 
Insecure property rights is the percentage in the World Bank’s World Business Environment survey that 
reported that they disagreed in most cases or strongly disagreed that the legal system will uphold contract 
and property rights. Governance Index from World Bank 1999; revenue data from World Bank 2002 (CD-
ROM). Crime rates from UNDP 1999: 24. Transition policies from historical narratives.  
 
 
Putting all of these causal arguments together, we see the disadvantages from the full 
package of Shock Therapy for firm performance, as well as the indirect effects on state 
capacity. Failing firms and a failing state creates a vicious cycle of enterprise failure and 
bureaucratic breakdown, resulting in what Burawoy calls “involution” (1996) as wealth is 
pumped out of the system. Figure 1 captures the causality in this circle.    19
Figure 1: The Vicious Cycle of Enterprise and State Failure Created by Shock 
Therapy  
  
  
 
 
Rather than a system of rational modern capitalism emerging in the Former Soviet 
Union and much of Eastern Europe, a system of “patrimonial capitalism” seems to have 
taken root (King 2002; King and Szelenyi 2003). Following Weber (1978), this is a 
system in which extensive personal networks link (1) state elites and enterprise owners 
(political capitalism), (2) enterprise managers and their employees (merging workers with 
the means of production and subsistence), and (3) managers in upstream and downstream 
companies (non-market mechanisms of exchange). It is also characterized by a non-
bureaucratic state.
8  
To the extent that firms can retreat from product markets via horizontal networks 
with other firms, and from labor markets through the binding of workers to the enterprise 
by the direct provision of the means of subsistence, capitalists will not be forced to 
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reinvest in the means of production to maximize the price-cost ratio. Indeed, given the 
pervasiveness of political capitalism and the non-bureaucratic nature of the state, such a 
strategy will be risky. Rather, it is more rational to invest resources to maximize political 
power (see Brenner’s notion of “political accumulation” [1976]), or to “capture the 
financial flow” and channel as much money out of the country into private bank accounts 
as possible. By all indications, this is what has been, and still is, happening in Russia on 
an enormous scale. “[T]he dimensions of capital flight from Russia is about $40 billion a 
year,” an amount, coincidentally, that is about equal to the extremely high level of 
foreign investment in China in the late 1990s (Golovachev 2002). 
 
The Empirical Record  
A comparison of the reform experience of the central Eastern European countries 
(Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Slovenia) and the biggest 
postcommunist states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan), along 
with East Asian reform-communist systems (China and Vietnam), reveals a very strong 
pattern that is almost completely inconsistent with neoliberal theory and completely 
consistent with sociological theory. Owing to space considerations, this paper does not 
discuss all cases. Most of the unexamined cases are quite small -- Moldova (population: 4 
million), Armenia (4 million), Azerbaijan (8 million), Croatia (4 million), Serbia (11 
million), Georgia (5 million), Macedonia (2 million), Tajikistan (6 million) -- and have 
experienced very serious external or internal wars, events that are likely to overwhelm 
any effect of economic policy on economic performance.    21
The remaining unanalyzed states are also very small, and were very dependent on imports 
and exports from Russia, as can be seen by the ratio of imports and exports to the CMEA 
as a percentage of GDP in 1990: Turkmenistan (population: 5.2 million, and 33.0%), 
Kyrgyzstan (4.9 million and 27.7%), Lithuania (3.7 million and 40.9%), Latvia (2.4 
million and 36.7%), Estonia (1.4 million and 30.2%), Mongolia (2.4 million and 31%). 
Albania (3.4 million and 6.6%), although not greatly influenced by the collapse of CMEA 
trade and Russia, was severely affected by the Kosovo crisis (the country was inundated 
by more than 450,000 refugees). Generally, the smaller the country, the greater the 
chance that it will be even more dependent on the fate of the Russian economy, or that it 
is able to get enough FDI to partially reorient the economy toward manufacturing exports 
to the West (as seems to be happening in the Baltic States, most prominently Estonia).
9 
Thus, the less likely domestic economic policy will have a major effect on performance.  
 
Russia Compared with China: Neoliberal Versus Gradualist and Statist Transition 
Policies 
Looking first at the two biggest cases of postcommunist transformation broadly 
conceived, China and Russia, we see a pattern that is impossible to square with neoliberal 
theory. Russia’s transition policy was crafted and implemented by radical neoliberal 
reformers with extremely close working relationships with Jeffrey Sachs and other 
leading neoclassical theorists (see Wedel 2001: 123-174). Yeltsin and the young 
reformers led by Gaidar and Chubais implemented all three elements of the Shock 
Therapy package in spectacular fashion. China, in contrast, systematically violated every   22
neoliberal precept. China’s vastly superior performance, as compared with Russia’s, is 
thus inconsistent with neoliberal theory. 
In Russia, in January 1992, “[a] radical reform package focusing on economic 
liberalization and privatization was adopted …” (EBRD 1996: 169). This also included a 
stabilization policy, initiated by Yegor Gaidar (the acting prime minister in 1991-92), that 
is justly famous. “An extraordinary improvement in the budget balance -- a text book 
example -- was accomplished. Arms procurement was initially cut by 85 percent, … 
Many subsidies were cut and state investments were minimized…. The old Soviet 
government administration had also been radically reduced through its merger with the 
Russian government” (Aslund 1995: 187). As a result, government spending (along with 
the government) shrank enormously in one year. Russia also moved to curtail credit: 
“The refinance rate was only 20 percent per annum at the beginning of 1992. It was 
raised to 50 percent per annum that April and to 80 percent per annum in June” (Aslund 
1995: 188). In an endnote, the author writes, “These official rates are not properly 
compounded. The official interest … rate of 80 percent …was actually 117 percent per 
annum” [note 6]).  
Liberalization was accomplished equally swiftly. “Price liberalization was imposed 
through a presidential decree of December 3, 1991, ‘Measures to Liberalize Prices,’ 
which [stated] that ‘on January 2, 1992 [the Russian Federation would undertake] the 
basic transition to free (market) prices and tariffs formed under the influence of demand 
and supply’ on producer goods, consumer goods, services and labor…. [The plan] took 
place as announced on January 2, 1992” (Aslund 1995: 140). Similarly, “a substantial 
liberalization of foreign trade went into effect in January 1992 …,” even if this was less   23
than desired. The state trading monopoly was also abolished (EBRD 1999: 258). Six 
months after Gaidar’s stabilization and liberalization measures were implemented, a mass 
privatization program relying on citizen vouchers was launched in June of 1992. “By July 
of 1994, 15,052 medium and large-scale enterprises, employing more than 80 per cent of 
the industrial workforce, had been privatized …” (EBRD 1996: 169). This was far and 
away the largest transformation of property in history.  
Russia’s horrid performance is in sharp contrast to the spectacular growth in 
China in this same period. China achieved stunning success despite the fact that it carried 
out none of the three elements of Shock Therapy. Rather than pursue radical capitalist 
reforms, China implemented an agrarian reform in 1978 that transferred the control of 
land to peasant households (with long-term leases) and allowed them to market their 
production after meeting state quotas. Combined with 1984 reforms allowing the 
formation of village and township enterprises (VTEs), dynamic rural industrialization 
took off. These VTEs were marketized firms with hybrid ownership patterns (part local 
state, part private ownership) (see Nee 1992; Walder 1995; Oi 1999). The VTEs, 
combined with significant flows of FDI, more than 70% of it from Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, created a large group of export-oriented labor-intensive manufacturers (Naughton 
1997: 11).  
Privatization of large SOEs began only in 1994, after a large class of domestic 
capitalists already exists. Local governments adapt the speed of privatization, and local 
welfare policies, to minimize negative externalities. As a result, rapid large-scale 
privatization is normally carried out only in those areas where there are many private 
firms, so that the economic disruption (such as unemployment) is minimized (Cau,   24
Quian, and Weingast 1997: 15; Naughton 1998: 276). Instead, many SOEs have been 
“corporatized” or turned into Joint Stock Companies. Typically, the government (through 
the treasury remains the biggest shareholder, while other state-owned investment 
institutions also have large blocks of shares. In spite of this momentous change, by 2002 
only a tiny fraction of SOEs had been privatized. 
By growing a capitalist sector from below, China developed a mixed economy in 
the course of two decades. Price liberalization proceeded in connection with the growth 
of the unplanned private and VTE sectors. It began in agriculture in 1978, with peasants 
allowed to sell their surplus production for market prices once they met their quota to the 
state at fixed prices. As these reforms proved effective, they were extended to the rest of 
the economy, so that SOEs could sell their output that was above the requirements of the 
plan at market prices. As the non-planned sector grew, more and more of the economy 
was free of price controls (McKinnon 1995: 98). Thus, China has “grown out of the 
plan,” in Naughton’s apt phrase (1995). Prices in the planned sector were also gradually 
rationalized to reflect the market price; by the early 1990s, more than 70% of prices were 
decontrolled, up from 10% in 1981 (McKinnon 1995: 104).  
Trade liberalization was handled in the same manner, with special economic 
zones set up in Guangdong (these were connected to Hong Kong trade). In these zones, 
which became numerous and spread along the coast, “exporters could retain all of the 
foreign exchange earnings while having freer access to imported materials and foreign 
capital or trading services” (McKinnon 1995: 99). By the 1990s, “the difference between 
‘special economic zones’ and the rest of the economy had been eroded” (McKinnon 
1995: 99). Finally, even though China managed to avoid the hyperinflation that had   25
devastated Russia after liberalization, it did so not because of the implementation of 
monetarist stabilization policies. Broad money, which includes printed money plus easily 
available credit, “[H]as been very high -- averaging about 23 percent per year for more 
than a decade” (McKinnon 1995: 107).  
The contrast between Chinese and Russian performance couldn’t be more stark. 
Measured in 1995 US$, GDP per capita shrank by 35% in Russia and expanded by 137% 
in China. Male life expectancy during the period from 1991 to 2000 declined by five 
years in Russia and grew by two years in China. By the late 1990s, Russia was losing 
about $40 billion a year in official and unofficial capital flight, about equal to the amount 
of FDI flowing into China. Indeed, China has had the best growth in the world since 
starting its reforms, while Russia (along with other postcommunist countries) has 
experienced the greatest peacetime decline ever recorded (Stiglitz 2002). 
Neoliberals could dismiss the Russian-Chinese comparison by arguing that the 
“advantages of lateness” are actually much more important than economic policy, and 
that they account for the observed difference between East Asia and the rest of the 
postcommunist world (see Parker, Sachs, and Woo 1994). As Table 2 indicates, China 
and Russia had two very different starting points. China was experiencing not only a 
transition to a more capitalistic economy but a transition to an industrial society as well. 
The argument is that a very large gain in labor productivity occurs as people leave ultra-
low-productivity traditional agriculture for rural industrial production. The late 
industrializer is able to combine super-cheap labor with recent, if not the newest, 
technological production methods (the “trailing edge” technologies and industries). This 
gives exporters enormous price advantages in international markets, allowing them to   26
earn hard currency to fund the purchase of technology for further labor-productivity-
enhancing investments (and further exports). 
In addition, the communists lost power in Russia, whereas the Chinese 
Communist Party is alive and well after crushing the democracy movement at Tiananmen 
Square. Competitive elections might arguably make a difference, as special interests 
could exert influence to weaken necessary reforms. Alternatively, competitive elections 
can reduce corruption by making politicians accountable, and thereby contribute to 
growth. However, looking at the diversity of political outcomes in the postcommunist 
world (Table 2), we see that China and Russia are actually on a continuum. Belarus and 
the Central Asian countries are dictatorships, while Russia, Ukraine, and many of the 
countries of southern Europe are best understood as semi-authoritarian regimes (McFaul 
2002). Similarly, the communists in China are well on their way to being just another 
dictatorship, as communist ideology becomes hollowed out, as typified by the invitation 
of private entrepreneurs into the Party.  
Still, because countries in different regions have very different histories and may 
well be operating in very different environments, comparisons between countries in 
different regions makes it more difficult to discern causality. It is therefore useful to 
compare postcommunist countries in the same region. This provides a very rough control 
for a host of variables that can affect economic performance, such as geographical 
proximity to the advanced core, geopolitics, culture (or religion), level of development, 
political stability, and strength of democracy. For this reason, these comparisons are 
perhaps the most compelling demonstration of the dangers of Shock Therapy.    27
The following comparisons, as well as the coding of policy variables in Tables 1, 
3, 4, and 5, are based on the sources listed in the historical narratives in Appendix 1.  
 
The Central European Cases Compared  
  It is rather remarkable that the Czech Republic has had the lowest economic 
growth in the region (see Table 1), a meager one percent in 10 years, despite the fact that 
it was the most developed country in the region (excluding tiny Slovenia), obtained the 
largest amount of FDI per capita, had a very low level of external debt, and had the 
historical legacy of being the industrial heartland of the Austro-Hungarian empire. 
Because of these advantages, the fact that the Czech Republic pursued the most ambitious 
mass privatization is a gigantic problem for advocates of the full neoliberal package. In 
Poland and Slovenia, the legacy of worker organizations prevented the rapid privatization 
of large socialist-era enterprises. In the Slovak Republic, Vladimir Meciar, at the time the 
bête noire of the West, canceled the second wave of voucher privatization after the split 
with the Czech Republic. Thus, Slovakia experienced a significantly smaller privatization 
shock than the Czech Republic. 
The argument advanced in this paper about the negative effects of mass 
privatization on state capacity (bureaucratization) is similarly supported by the Central 
European comparison. As is clear from Table 4, the Czech Republic records a lower 
value for the EBRD’s indicator of state capacity, and has by far the largest increase in 
recorded crime. The greater insecurity of property rights relative to its neighbors should 
be deeply troubling to the neoliberals as well. Since the Czech Republic is as democratic 
as other countries in the region, it is quite plausible that this is the direct result of the   28
greater privatization shock experienced in that country. As Table 3 clearly shows, the 
Czech Republic also had the smallest level of capital formation, the greatest decline in 
government consumption, and the greatest decline in the number of scientists and 
engineers in R. & D., in spite of its very high level of FDI. If not for the Czech 
Republic’s privileged location and history, which enabled this high level of FDI, its 
economic performance would have been substantially worse.  
The Central European cases are also interesting when assessing the role of FDI in 
the transition. In comparison to the FSU, there are much higher levels of FDI overall, and 
thus a much greater export of Western capitalist property relations. This does not favor 
the neoliberal position, however, because even if FDI is a consequence of pro-FDI 
(presumably neoliberal) policies, a position that is very difficult to sustain empirically,
10 
the fact remains that in Central Europe the developmental outcome is the opposite of the 
neoliberal expectation. That is, even if high levels of FDI accrue to countries with more 
neoliberal policy regimes, thus far this has not balanced out the negative effects of the 
Shock Therapy package -- especially mass privatization.  
 
Eastern Europe: Bulgaria and Romania Compared 
Both Romania and Bulgaria pursued a good deal of Shock Therapy, although only 
Romania implemented a significant mass privatization program. As Table 1 shows, 
Romania, the more complete neoliberal reformer, performed slightly more poorly than 
Bulgaria.
11 Not only did it have worse growth; it had a sharper increase in poverty, and a 
much greater fall in kindergarten enrollment rates. And, as my neoclassical sociological 
theory would predict, Bulgaria had a relatively stronger state than Romania on all four   29
indicators (although the difference in property rights is too small to be significant) (Table 
4). Still, in both countries, generally, economic performance has been terrible, 
somewhere between the central Eastern European nations and the Former Soviet Union. 
This is partially explained by the higher level of integration that Bulgaria and Romania 
had in the CMEA relative to the central Eastern European cases (Table 2) and their 
inability to attract FDI (cumulative net FDI inflows per capita 1990-2000 were only $403 
in Bulgaria and $292 in Romania).
12  
Overall, Shock Therapy advocates would have a tough time explaining Bulgarian 
and Romanian performance. If they claim that stabilization and liberalization policies are 
enough Shock Therapy to be responsible for growth in Poland, they will have a hard time 
explaining why these policies did not produce more growth in Romania and Bulgaria. 
Neoliberals would claim, especially in Bulgaria, that the policies did not work because 
they were not implemented consistently. However, Poland also reversed many of the 
neoliberal policies of the Balcerowicz program after 1993 without damaging Poland’s 
performance. Indeed, growth took off only after policy was changed following the 
election of a left-wing government that had an explicitly interventionist policy (see 
Kolodko and Nuti 1997; Snadjer and King 2002).  
 
European States of the Former Soviet Union  
The pattern found in Central and Eastern Europe also appears to hold among the 
successor states of the Former Soviet Union. The neoliberal explanation would predict 
that, all things being equal, those successor states which pursued more Shock Therapy   30
would perform better than those which performed less Shock Therapy. Here, again, the 
comparative evidence disconfirms the neoliberal position.  
Russia, as discussed above, had a triple dose of Shock Therapy. Belarus, under 
the anti-Western populist Alyaxandar Lukashenka, had none of the three components. 
Belarus’s average rate of growth per capita was a poor -0.5%, but Russia, which adhered 
far more stringently to neoliberal prescriptions than Belarus did, had a -3.5% growth rate 
in the same period, six times as big a fall. Ukraine’s transition policies were somewhere 
between Russia’s and Belarus’s, but much closer to the former. Ukraine clearly had 
enough Shock Therapy that neoliberals would predict much higher growth than in 
Belarus. Again, the record is inconsistent with the neoliberal position: average GDP per 
capita shrank by an amazing 7.5% per year from 1991 to 2000.  
The relationship between neoliberal policy (especially mass privatization) and 
state capacity follows the same pattern as in central Eastern Europe. Belarus is superior to 
Russia and Ukraine on three of the four indicators of state capacity. The only exception is 
Russia’s lower crime rate, but this is probably a consequence of underreporting in Russia, 
as discussed above. 
 
Central Asian States of the Former Soviet Union 
  Let us take a final look at the last two large successor states, both part of Central 
Asia: Kazakhstan (population: 16 million) and Uzbekistan (24 million). Kazakhstan was 
the star reformer of Central Asia, and implemented all three of the postcommunist 
reforms. Despite this fairly close adherence to the Shock Therapy package, the economy 
shrank by 2.5% a year. Uzbekistan pursued a transition policy that was much more at   31
odds with neoliberal prescriptions, implementing none of the neoliberal package. Yet 
Uzbekistan’s GDP per capita decreased an average of 2.0% a year, 25% less than the 
decline in Kazakhstan (this despite the high level of FDI drawn to Kazakhstan’s oil 
reserves). In Kazakhstan, a quarter of this growth occurred in 2000, when there was a 
dramatic increase of 10%. This growth followed a huge spike in oil prices in that year 
($28 per barrel, compared with only $10 per barrel in February 1999 [UNCTAD 2001: 
294]).  
From 1991 to 2000, poverty in Kazakhstan increased by 1300%, compared with 
160% in Uzbekistan. Even the decline in kindergarten enrollment was more than three 
times as great (see Table 1). Similarly, in the indicators for which both countries have 
data, Uzbekistan has much higher state capacity than Kazakhstan (see Table 4). This 
outcome is, from the neoliberal perspective, quite unlikely, and is all the more surprising 
because of Kazakhstan’s far more favorable starting point. Kazakhstan was much more 
developed and better educated, and marginally less integrated into the CMEA system 
(Table 2).  
Table 5 summarizes the neoliberal reforms carried out in the 14 countries, as well 
as the key initial conditions and the outcomes of growth, state capacity, and security of 
property rights. It is clear that in every region except in East Asia the countries that came 
the closest to the neoliberal blueprint (often because they carried out mass privatization 
schemes) had worse growth performance, less state capacity, and weaker property rights. 
This finding is even more striking considering that in three of the regions the most 
neoliberal states also had significant advantages. The Czech Republic had a high level of 
development, low debt, and low dependence on the CMEA. Only Slovenia had a higher   32
GDP, but it also lost the huge Serbian market. Bulgaria had far higher external debt than 
Romania. In the European FSU, Russia was, compared with Belarus and Ukraine, 
advantaged in terms of initial starting position and the impact of the breakup of the 
CMEA. And Kazakhstan was far more advantaged than Uzbekistan, without even 
considering its oil reserves.  
In East Asia, Vietnam, the country with the closer adherence to Shock Therapy, 
grew at only 60% of the rate that China grew. Because countries in this regions are also 
undergoing a transition to industrialization, China was disadvantaged compared with 
Vietnam. Vietnam was even less industrialized, and started its reforms a decade later. 
Unfortunately, the comparison of Chinese and Vietnamese state capacity is complicated 
by missing data. Taxation as a percentage of GDP measure of state capacity is much 
lower in China than in Vietnam, but China’s giant size and enormous growth makes this 
measure potentially very misleading. China has grown so fast that the government still 
increased its revenues faster than all the other countries in the comparison, and, as Table 
3 indicates, it had the greatest gain in government consumption by far. By all accounts, 
its bureaucracy is fairly well functioning, and a command issued by the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo will be carried out in the most remote village in short order. 
And, as measured by perceived enforcement of contracts and property rights, China is 
among the best performers in the postcommunist world. 
 
Inconsistent Data 
Before concluding, let me preemptively address some of the cases that readers 
might have noticed which don’t seem to fit the pattern of causality implied in my model.   33
The first thing about these outliers is that they underline the number of variables affecting 
economic outcomes. As a result, there is bound to be a lot of unaccounted-for variance. 
One major uncaptured variable concerns the historically contingent development of 
different leading sectors at different points in time. Thus, a country’s economic success 
will in part be determined by the dynamics of the particular global markets they are most 
embedded in. Furthermore, there are likely to be significant uncaptured political 
variables. Things like “the balance of political power” (both domestically and 
geopolitically) are very difficult to measure in any kind of reliable way, although this 
balance of power undoubtedly has an impact on economic actors in myriad ways. As a 
result of this complexity, we should not be surprised that all indicators do not line up 
perfectly for any theory, either neoliberal or neoclassical sociological. The claim of this 
paper is that, in terms of economic growth, human welfare, and state capacity 
(summarized by Table 5), the data is far more consistent with the sociological theory than 
with the neoliberal theory.  
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Table 5: Economic Policy, Growth, State Capacity, and Property Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
Neoliberal 
Reforms 
SP/SL/SS 
GDP Per 
Capita 1990 
in constant 
1995 US$ 
Trade with 
CMEA as % 
GDP 1990 
External 
Debt 1989 
Per Capita 
current US$ 
Avg. GDP 
Per Capita 
Change 
1991-2000 
(in 1995 
US$) 
EBRD 
Governance 
Index (1-3) 
1999 
Insecure 
Property 
Rights  
1999 
Czech   SP/SL/SS  $5,270 6.0%  $636  0.1  1.59  23.3 
Slovakia  SL/SS  $4,048 6.0%  $365  0.4  1.65  14.0 
Poland  SL/SS  $2,990 8.4%  $1,134 3.7  1.69  10.3 
Hungary  SL/SS  $4,857 13.7% $2,040 1.3  1.98 12.0 
Slovenia  SL/SS  $9,659 4.0%  NA  1.9  1.95  11.4 
           
Russia  SP/SL/SS  $3,666 11.1% $364  -3.5  1.16  41.6 
Belarus    $3,057 41.0% NA  -0.5  1.57  30.4 
Ukraine  SP/SL/SS  $1,969 23.8% $11  -7.1  1.24  44.0 
           
Kazakh.   SP/SL/SS  $1,995 20.8% $2  -2.5  1.27  31.0 
Uzbek.     $611 25.5%  $3  -2.0  1.83  9.6 
           
Romania  SP/SL/SS  $1,702 16.8% $473  -1.8  1.07  21.6 
Bulgaria  SL/SS  $1,716 16.1% $1,126 -1.4  1.38  20.0 
           
China    $349 2.3% $40  9.0  NA  11.0 
Vietnam  SL/SS  $206 15.0%  $319 5.5  NA  NA 
 
SP (Shock Privatization) = Privatized at least 25% of large SOEs under a mass privatization program 
within two years. 
SL (Shock Liberalization) = Liberalized at least 75% of imports and domestic prices within two years. 
SS (Shock Stabilization) = Implemented an IMF approved stabilization package. 
Source: Historical summaries and previous tables.  
 
 
Still, we should closely examine the data that doesn’t fit neatly into the causal 
theory traced above, and see if any patterns are revealed. The majority of surprising 
findings are found in Table 3, on enterprise restructuring. The relevant part of the theory 
for this table is that Shock Therapy induces (1) barter, (2) overdue wages, (3) a decrease 
in investment, (4) a decrease in government spending, and (5) a decrease in highly 
educated skilled manpower. It is clear from Table 3 that these processes are going on to a   35
large extent in many of the postcommunist countries. To the extent that these are above 
all else “survival strategies” of firms, and that all firms in the postcommunist world 
suffered severe economic dislocation (if by nothing else than the collapse of their core: 
Russian inputs and markets accessed through the CMEA system), this data is consistent 
with the overall causal story traced above.  
Close scrutiny of the data, however, reveals what appears to be some strange 
outcomes. For example, the Central European prevalence of strategies of non-market 
withdrawal is surprising. In particular, the Czech Republic’s and Hungary’s much lower 
measurements of these practices than Slovakia, Slovenia, and Poland. In this case, the 
differences in the structure of property among the cases account for this apparent 
anomalous pattern, because different types of property have different propensities for 
engaging in this type of activity.  
Slovenia, Slovakia, and Poland had high levels of state ownership of large 
enterprises, and more modest levels of foreign ownership, compared with Hungary and 
the Czech Republic. Research in Hungary (Toth 2001) indicates that firms with foreign 
ownership are much less likely to tolerate inter-enterprise arrears, and do not make late 
payments to employees, taxes, or other firms. Large SOEs, by contrast, are likely to find 
it relatively easy to engage in these practices, because they have the same network links 
to managers at other SOEs that served for this type of “horizontal” exchange in the 
socialist period. The state is also likely to tolerate such behavior, when it is advantageous 
for “their” firms to do this. Thus, the much higher levels of FDI in Hungary and the 
Czech Republic and corresponding lower levels of large SOEs probably overwhelm the 
impact of Shock Therapy on these indicators by 1999.   36
 The only other indicator in the Central European group which seems surprising is 
the very high level of erosion of the human capital base in Slovenia and Slovakia 
compared with Hungary and Poland, as measured in the change in the number of 
scientists and engineers in R. & D. In Slovakia’s case, sectoral effects are probably at 
work. The split with the Czech Republic left Slovakia with most of the military industrial 
complex, a sector whose market (Soviet and Czechoslovak military purchases) all but 
disappeared. Political commitments prohibited finding alternative markets for these 
weapons. Thus, much of Slovakia’s R. & D. capacity would necessarily be eliminated, 
with daunting chances for real civilian conversion. 
Another factor at work, quite possibly in Slovenia, is that this indicator also 
indicates brain drain -- the migration of those with scientific training to Western Europe. 
Bulgaria, the overall outlier on this indicator (-71%), is probably catching the 
exceptionally large brain drain that occurred from that country (more than 10% of 
Bulgaria’s population, and a higher proportion of the educated workforce, emigrated 
[Stiglitz 2002: 154]). Slovenia, given its proximity to Western Europe and the rise of 
trade with Europe in the late 1960s, had a long-established practice of “labor contracting” 
in the West. Once real labor markets were established, and technical personnel were free 
to work anywhere they wanted, it would not be surprising if many found employment 
right next door in Italy or Austria. 
Overall, there is not a very tight fit between pursuing Shock Therapy policies and 
these indicators of enterprise restructuring, for all of the reasons stated above. This is not 
really surprising. Things like barter arrangements, and especially inter-enterprise arrears, 
in the Central European context, for example, might not be terribly inefficient and “non-  37
rational” given the more substantial state capacity in the region. By the late 1990s, these 
practices could simply be functional replacements for things like inter-firm trade credits 
in the West (Shaffer 2000).  
There are only a couple of outliers remaining. Vietnam’s higher change in capital 
formation compared with China’s is explained by Vietnam’s lower starting point at the 
beginning of its reforms in the late 1980s, about a decade later than China’s first major 
reforms. Export-led takeoff in a very poor agricultural society means that increases in 
investment will be proportionally higher, even though overall investment is less.  
The final outlier in the table is the change in final government consumption in 
Bulgaria compared with Romania. This apparent anomaly isn’t such a problem. First, the 
difference between Bulgaria and Romania in terms of neoliberalism is fairly small, 
despite Romania’s being coded as implementing a mass privatization program. Romania 
had the smallest program coded as “mass privatization” -- covering around 25% of SOEs. 
Thus, differences between these indicators in these two countries might reflect other 
factors relatively more than in the other comparisons. Second, Romania pursued policies 
that were much less monetarist, when measured in annual increases in broad money 
(Romania increased M2 -- money plus credit -- significantly more than Bulgaria did in all 
but one of the years that the World Bank recorded this data [World Bank 2002]). To the 
extent that this spending funded government consumption (i.e., Romania reaped an 
inflation tax), this accounts for the difference.  
Despite a lot of noise in the tables, the relationship of Shock Therapy to measures of 
growth, human welfare, and state capacity have a much tighter fit with sociological   38
theory than with neoliberal theory (as seen in Tables 4 and 5). On these comparisons, its 
superiority to neoliberal theory is established.  
Conclusion  
   The market was not an adequate substitute for a developmental state, and 
therefore the insertion of the postcommunist states into the global capitalist economy 
resulted in de-industrialization, de-modernization, and widespread impoverishment. As 
Sachs suggested, markets do spring up as soon as state bureaucrats vacate the field, only 
they spring up in low-tech small and medium-sized businesses with some type of “natural 
protection” (e.g., the high cost of shipping furniture means that there is a furniture 
industry in virtually every country). This produces a capitalist economy dominated by a 
few politically connected financial-industrial groups centered on the exploitation of raw 
materials; a relatively small, poorly paying, and non-dynamic small and medium-sized 
enterprise sector; and a huge base of “kiosk” capitalism and various types of petty-trading 
and self-provision strategies. This is nothing less than a “great leap backward” moving 
most of the postcommunist world closer to the Third World than to Europe. Only those 
countries that violated neoliberal precepts or were able to re-industrialize on the basis of 
very large flows of FDI avoided this fate. This finding presents a very large paradox for 
the neoliberals. They believe that Shock Therapy will allow the free market to create a 
liberal capitalist society. Rather, the application of the neoliberal transition program 
results in a less liberal outcome. 
We can see this when comparing Poland and Russia. According to the EBRD, on 
a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the most liberal, Russia is a 2 and Poland an 8 (2000: 
21). And few analysts would disagree that Poland’s economy is far closer to the “liberal   39
capitalist” societies found in Western Europe. Many analysts take this to mean that 
Poland has been far more faithful to neoliberal policy advice than Russia has. However, 
the fact that Poland is more “liberal” than Russia in 1999 is not the same thing as saying 
that neoliberal strategies work better than statist and gradualist ones. As measured by the 
speed of liberalization, the severity of stabilization, and the extent of rapid large-scale 
privatization of SOEs via mass privatization, Russia was far more neoliberal than Poland, 
at least up through the mid-1990s. By 1994, all three major reforms were implemented in 
Russia, and Poland was acknowledged to be more of a protectionist, a less stringent 
monetarist, and a much slower privatizer than Russian (see Appendix 1; see also Murell 
1993; Stiglitz 2002: 181-2; see also comments to this effect by Sachs and Lipton 1992 
and Aslund 1995).  
Thus, neoliberal policies, when really implemented, have the opposite effect than 
what was intended. We can see this in many areas. A clear example is in monetary 
policy. Neoliberals want tight money and high interest rates in order to limit the amount 
of money circulating, and thereby to control inflation. However, in Russia, these 
monetarist policies contributed to financial crises for firms, with the response being the 
rise of barter and inter-enterprise arrears and the production of local monies. This in turn 
induced the federal government to print more money, in order to try to “re-nationalize” 
the economy (Woodruff 1999). Time-series data shows that increases in inter-enterprise 
debt correlate with an increase in tax non-remittance, as well as with an increase in the 
supply of broad money (Bernstam and Rabushka 2002: 6). Therefore, to the extent that 
Shock Therapy damages firms, this damages state revenues, forcing the state to print 
money to cover the deficit, thereby inducing inflation. In other words, enterprise failure   40
in Russia produces a stream of events that produces the opposite monetary effect than the 
neoliberals intended. Thus, extreme neoliberal transition programs are likely to create 
havoc, causing changes in the state and the economy which are distinctively nonliberal. 
  In retrospect, we can see that Sachs, perhaps the most visible intellectual leader of 
the neoliberal vanguard, had got it half right back in the early 1990s: “At the base of all 
of this transformation [is] … the idea … that the postcommunist world has the potential 
to grow more rapidly than the develop[ed]
13 world and thereby to narrow the gap in 
living standards, if they harmonize institutions and join their economies to the global 
economic system” (Sachs 1994: 25. Emphasis in original). Unlike some formulations that 
equate globalization with neocolonial exploitation in the tradition of world systems 
analysis (Chussodovsky 1997; Gowan 1999; Ander and Summers 1998), the sociological 
analysis I offer suggests that postcommunist economies should “join their economies to 
the global system.” The ability of Central European states to attract foreign investment 
and to export manufactured goods to Western Europe has allowed them to avoid the fate 
of the FSU and Eastern Europe. The disagreement with the neoliberals from the 
neoclassical sociological position sketched here is that, “if they harmonize institutions” 
along the lines laid out by the IMF and the World Bank, they initiate their own de-
modernization, making sure that they join the global economy not as equals but as de-
industrialized and substantially poorer economies with less effective states.  
While this analysis has emphasized Shock Therapy’s developmental pathologies, 
we must also acknowledge that the postcommunist countries needed economic reforms. 
State socialism was in a long-term economic crisis, even if the actual breakdown of 
communist regimes is best understood as a legitimacy crisis (Szelenyi and Szelenyi   41
1995). Arguably, the postcommunist countries needed to do two things. First, they 
needed to increase incentives for economic agents to be efficient. Second, they needed to 
have a rough fiscal/monetary balance. That is, they could not indefinitely continue to 
spend substantially more money than they earned, lest they ignite hyperinflation. 
However, there were many different ways in which these changes could have been made 
besides Shock Therapy. Privatization is not the only way to increase incentives to be 
efficient. Long-term leases, hybrid property forms, and promoting a small and medium-
sized enterprise sector without privatizing large enterprises can be a superior alternative. 
The postcommunist countries could have taken the Keynesian approach of lowering 
interest rates and increasing government spending during downturns rather than pushing 
more austerity measures when their economies contracted. They could have adopted 
selective protection, gradual marketization, and industrial policy. And, indeed, the most 
successful cases, like China and Poland, did these things. This should not really be 
surprising, considering that the history of development since the explosion of capitalism 
in England has been that countries close the gap with the richest parts of the global 
economy not by harmonizing their institutions but, rather, by innovating their institutions, 
most prominently the role of the state and employer-employee relations in facilitating 
capitalist development (Brenner 1998). 
If the transition to modern economic capitalism failed in Russia because of an 
improper orientation to the role of the state in the transition, one obvious conclusion of 
this analysis is that a strong state is needed to lead development in postcommunist 
societies. How one strengthens the state, let alone what the developmental strategy should 
be for such a state to follow, can only be a matter of speculation. We should not expect   42
for there to be one approach that will work in all cases. What might be feasible and 
desirable for Slovenia might be quite different from what might be feasible and desirable 
for Russia or Uzbekistan. Large countries such as Russia and Ukraine could more 
plausibly attempt to follow the Korean path -- using the protected domestic market to 
help grow “national champions” in export industries.  
The neoclassical sociological analysis implies that postcommunist states do not 
need a Pinochet. Simply “getting tougher” on corruption, as Putin and the neoliberals 
advocate -- using a strong state to enforce the neoliberal vision -- will probably be self-
defeating unless it is able to attract huge levels of FDI. Such FDI is not forthcoming in 
Russia or most of the postcommunist world outside Central Europe and the Baltics, and it 
probably never was. Relying on FDI to develop an economy, as some advocate, is a 
classic example of “many are called, few are chosen.” It seems likely that only an 
industrial policy that creates some growth and stability will allow postcommunist 
economies to attract significant levels of FDI outside of the raw-material sectors.  
Unlike Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s, in the postcommunist world 
such FDI will inevitably be very important because it alone guarantees an export market 
for manufactured goods, and therefore makes the winning of world market share much 
easier. If this is true even in the giant China, this should also be true in the smaller 
postcommunist countries. And, while a heavy reliance on FDI isn’t necessary, capturing 
significant world market share does seem to be necessary to close the gap with the richer 
countries. There are no historical cases, at least since World War II, of a country closing 
the developmental gap without capturing a significant share of the world market for 
manufactured goods (see Brenner 1998).    43
Another question is of the permanence of the current postcommunist condition in 
the FSU and Eastern Europe -- whether this type of patrimonial capitalism is really a 
“new equilibrium.” Many who are sympathetic to neoliberals invoke an undertheorized 
modernization argument: what Russia and other states are going through is an inevitable 
stage in the transition to capitalism, analogous to the U.S. during the reign of the robber 
barons. Only time will tell if this is true. However, the fact that the erosion of human 
capital tends to get worse over time, as disadvantages early in life (such as steep declines 
in kindergarten enrollment, or an increase in low birthweights) come to fruition years 
later, would indicate that this might not be the case. Moreover, once a grand bourgeoisie 
consisting primarily of competing clans of politically connected “oligarchs” has been 
formed (and thus the state has lost much of its bureaucratic character), it will be very 
difficult to lay the foundations for the growth of a new and dynamic private sector. 
The sociological position is that this is ultimately a question of class formation. 
What is the upper class in Russia and other postcommunist countries going to look like? 
Are there groups of owners with an interest in entrepreneurial activity as opposed to the 
parasitic/rentier behavior they have displayed so far? If not, patrimonial capitalism will 
continue to reproduce itself, on a constantly poorer basis in the long run. In order for such 
a change to happen, there must be a radical change with the current structuring of power, 
and some historical agent capable of transforming the system or at least initiating change. 
Unfortunately, there appear to be no such forces on the horizon.  
The working class is not likely to be such an agent. Labor in postcommunist 
society is not currently in a state of class formation but, rather, a profound dissolution 
based in the personalistic binding of workers to their failing factories for their   44
subsistence, and the rise of extreme sectoral inequalities. Workers in the Russian oil 
industry, for example, earn far more money than employees in other sectors, and 
businesses in these sectors capture a growing share of the shrinking economic pie 
(Vorobyov and Zhukov 2000: 19).  
Rather than class formation, what is emerging in most of the postcommunist 
world outside of East Asia and Central Europe is more a system of situses (from the Latin 
situ, meaning location) of competing vertical groups based in different spheres of society 
and the state. In Russia, for example, one of the major sectoral groups consists of firms in 
the oil and energy sectors. Thus, much “class action” by coal miners, for example, is 
better understood as situs-based action, in which workers, managers, and owners (if there 
are any distinct from the managers) have a coincidence of interests and act in concert.  
Given these unpropitious developments, we should not expect a reversal in 
postcommunist fortunes anytime soon. To really reverse the de-modernization would 
require rebuilding a bureaucratic state. This requires securing revenue streams, and a re-
nationalization of illegally privatized large raw-materials sectors would be a logical 
starting point (this would also restore quite a bit of legitimacy to the state). However, 
such a policy would probably need the support of the IMF and the World Bank. These 
organizations are unlikely to reverse their policies favoring privatization in every 
instance; but if they did it would require a change in the U.S. domestic scene which was 
big enough to change the position of the U.S. Treasury, the dominant force in these 
institutions (Stiglitz 2002).  
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Appendix 1: Historical Narratives of Economic Policies in 12 Postcommunist 
Countries. 
 
The following review of contemporary postcommunist history is very schematic 
and brief. This brevity is possible because, with a couple of exceptions, the facts of the 
matter are not actually in dispute, only the interpretation of these facts. In most of the 
following historical summaries, this paper relies on the same source as nearly all 
neoliberals: country summaries and data provided by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (a member of the World Bank), as well as many 
neoliberal authors themselves. It is hard to imagine any bias in this data running against 
the neoliberal position.
14 Of course, non-neoliberal experts, including many of the best 
institutional economists from postcommunist countries, are also cited.  
 
East Asia Reform Communism 
 
Vietnam 
Vietnam adopted agrarian reforms similar to China’s starting in 1981 and 
continuing in 1986 and 1988 (Riedel and Comer 1997: 191). The neoliberals would 
predict that Vietnam should have faster rates of growth than China, because, unlike 
China, it adopted orthodox stabilization and liberalization policies in 1989 even if it had a 
similar failure to rapidly privatize state-owned enterprises (Riedel and Comer 1997: 196, 
198, 203; Chussodovsky 1997: 151-152).    54
Central Europe  
The Czech Republic 
Czechoslovakia pursued a strong Shock Therapy regime, and (the Czech portion) 
“is now identified as the most resolute bastion of free market ideas in Eastern Europe …” 
(Frydman, Rapaczynski, and Turkewitz 1997: 87). The June 1990 election victory of 
Civic Forum brought with it Shock Therapy. Although Czechoslovakia did not have 
significant macroeconomic imbalances, they pursued a policy of “stabilizing a stable 
economy” (Poeschl 1996: 221). The most exceptional feature of this stabilization was the 
control of wages through “keep[ing] the nominal growth of wages significantly below 
inflation” (Frydman, Rapaczynski, and Turkewitz 1997: 63). Thus, real wages decreased 
by 6.3% in 1990 and 40% in 1991 (Frydman, Rapaczynski, and Turkewitz 1997: 65).  
Liberalization was pursued simultaneously with stabilization. While all prices 
were fixed in the neo-Stalinist regime prior to 1990, on January 1, 1991, a comprehensive 
liberalization was enacted, and within the year “most prices had been deregulated” 
(EBRD 1996: 147). Similarly, an “[a]lmost complete liberalization of quantitative 
controls on imports and exports was undertaken in 1991” (EBRD 1996: 147).  
  The Czech Republic gained most of its reputation as a leader in market reform 
from its innovative use of citizen vouchers to create potential owners of the large SOEs. 
“The whole thrust of the Czech policy was to privatize as quickly as possible, without 
any concern for the financial advantages of the state …” (Frydman, Rapaczynski, and 
Turkewitz 1997: 86). Privatization was accomplished in two “waves.” The first began in 
May 1992 and was over by mid-1993. Nineteen hundred large firms were privatized by a 
combination of vouchers and direct sales to foreign and domestic actors. In 988 of these   55
firms, individuals and investment funds used their vouchers to bid on the shares of 
companies. This was followed by a second wave of privatization, initiated in March 1994 
and completed on March 1, 1995. As a result of these two waves of privatization, “the 
private sector may have accounted for 75 per cent of GDP in 1996” (EBRD 1996: 146). 
Thus, the Czech Republic was among the most enthusiastic and faithful of the 
neoliberal Shock Therapy adherents. Some have charged that Klaus was actually a 
pragmatist who pursued social-democratic policies and merely paid lip service to 
neoliberal ideas (Rutland 1992-1993). This is a fundamentally mistaken interpretation of 
the Czech transition. The first Czech government did provide a social safety net, but this 
social-democratic policy took the form of a redistribution of wealth after market-led 
production decisions were made. This is a likely explanation for the Czech Republic’s 
relatively excellent performance on human development (poverty, health care, and 
education), as recorded in Table 1. The relevant facts are that macroeconomic policies 
were decidedly neoliberal. And even though the state retained some residual ownership in 
firms through the partial ownership of banks that in turn owned investment companies 
that in turn owned shares in companies, there is no evidence that the state tried to 
exercise this ownership (see King 2001a, Rona-Tas 1997). The state did not have the 
capacity to exercise these ownership rights even if it had the inclination, which it 
generally did not (McDermott 2001). 
 
Slovakia 
Slovakia, as part of Czechoslovakia, received the same stabilization and 
liberalization shocks as the Czech Republic. These policies of fiscal austerity and   56
liberalization were maintained by the subsequent Slovak governments (see EBRD 1999: 
264). In addition, it was still part of the federation when the first round of voucher 
privatization was carried out. From May 1992 to mid-1993, 750 Slovak enterprises were 
involved, with shares in 503 of these firms exchanged for vouchers (EBRD 1996: 172).  
After the Velvet Revolution, the new government canceled the second wave of 
voucher privatization. Citizen vouchers were exchanged for five-year bonds, which could 
be used for a wide variety of purposes (see EBRD 1996: 172). The government continued 
to privatize enterprises through direct sales, with a heavy reliance on management and 
employee buyouts (MEBOs), which required a down payment of 10-20%, with the 
remainder to be paid in installments. Frequently, these payments took the form of 
investment in the company itself (see EBRD 1996: 172). The government has also 
adopted a slew of policies to support small and medium-sized enterprises, including 
consulting services, training programs, and some loans (EBRD 1999: 173). Thus, 
Slovakia’s policies, in comparison with the Czech Republic’s, leaned more toward 
building “capitalism from below,” as in China, and using direct sales rather than 
vouchers. Even when shares were essentially given away through MEBOs, the 
government created incentives to ensure that new owners made investments in their 
companies. Indeed, if companies did not fulfill the terms of their privatization (in terms 
of paying for the installments -- often making investments), the government can review 
the privatization and reverse the privatization. “These reviews can lead to significant 
ownership changes and the government hopes to involve foreign strategic investors in the 
re-privatization process” (EBRD 1999: 262).  
   57
Slovenia  
While still part of Yugoslavia, Slovenia experienced the first dose of Shock 
Therapy in the region. IMF-sponsored macroeconomic reforms began in 1980, with a 
stabilization package, followed by another stabilization package, which included import 
liberalization and a freeze on investments in 1983. As the economy continued to slow, the 
“May Anti-inflation Programme” was initiated in 1988. In spite of these efforts to 
stabilize the economy, the rate of inflation shot up to 2700% in 1989 (Chussodovsky 
1997: 245-6). In response, the pro-U.S. government of Prime Minister Markovic came to 
the U.S. to meet with President Bush, and the result was a “big bang in mid-December 
1989, which served as a model for transition packages elsewhere in the region” (Amsden, 
Kochanowicz, and Taylor 1994: 34). The package included mostly stabilization 
measures, and also further liberalization, including the deregulation of the trade regime in 
January 1990. Real wages declined by 41% in the first half of 1990 (World Bank 1991: 
viii). This was matched by a fall in output of 8.5%: “Spurred in part by the failing 
economy, separatist movements in the republics pushed the Federation into a brutal war” 
(Amsden, Kochanowicz, and Taylor 1994: 34). 
Slovenia seceded in June 1991, but it managed essentially to avoid civil war (it 
lost only 30 soldiers). However, even before independence, “[c]omprehensive price 
liberalization came in 1990 at the time of the Markovic regime” (Gligorov 1995: 13). 
Prices were further freed up so that “[p]rice liberalization was almost complete by mid-
1994” (EBRD 1996: 175). Foreign trade was liberalized as well, although the Slovenian 
economy (as part of Yugoslavia) had experienced increasing openness since the early 
1960s. Indeed, by the “mid-1980s the EC was Slovenia’s main trading partner, more than   58
50% of Slovenia’s foreign trade being directed to that area” (Gligorov 1995: 8). 
Markovic’s reforms continued this trend, so that, by the end of “1994, 98 per cent of 
imports were free from quantitative restrictions. The estimated rate of effective protection 
amounts to 4 per cent (down from 38% before liberalization) begun” (EBRD 1996: 175). 
In Slovenia, capitalism from below was actually under way before the transition, 
resulting in “a surge of small scale private activity already in the late 1980s…. [T]he 
share of the private sector increased, though privatization was slow in coming. The 
private share in the GDP was about 8% before liberalization in the late 1980s and 
increased to about 40% (private and mixed firms together) at the end of 1994, even 
before privatization” (Gligorov 1995: 15, 18). Shock Therapy advocates were not able to 
garner enough political support to push through rapid large-scale privatization (see 
Mencinger 1996, Gligorov 1995 for details). The end result heavily favored firm insiders 
(Gligorov 1995: 16; EBRD 1998: 268). Of 1,549 companies that the government 
intended to privatize, only one privatization was completed in 1993, 113 by the end of 
1994, and 435 by the end of 1995 (EBRD 1996: 175; Mencinger 1996: 423). However, 
most of these were small and medium-sized enterprises, and even in 1999 “there has been 
little progress in the [area] of large-scale privatization” (EBRD 1999: 266). Further 
violation of neoliberal precepts occurred when Slovenia established a development 
corporation to restructure large enterprises before privatization, and in 1999 “[a] number 
of large-scale enterprises in the aluminum, steel and oil sectors are sill in the 
rehabilitation process …” (EBRD 1999: 266).  
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Hungary 
Hungary has often been described as a case of “gradualism,” compared with the 
rapidity of liberalization in Poland and privatization in Czechoslovakia. Though slightly 
less radical in these respects than its most prominent Central European neighbors, 
Hungary still initiated “ambitious market-oriented reforms between 1989 and 1991. 
Comprehensive liberalization was introduced for prices and foreign trade … the banking 
system became increasingly market-based and privatization was initiated” (EBRD 1996: 
153).  
“Most prices were liberalized” in January 1991 (EBRD 1999: 226). Since then, 
more than 90% of consumer prices are free of administrative control. Foreign trade was 
liberalized extremely quickly as well, from 1989 to 1991. By 1991, “licensing 
requirements and quotas” were eliminated in 90% of imports, up from 40% in 1989 
(EBRD 1996: 154). Actually, Hungary had liberalized quite a bit under socialism, so that 
the rapid trade liberalization of 1991 does not mean that Hungary liberalized very rapidly 
overall. Rather, Hungary experienced a substantial but gradual liberalization under 
socialism, followed by the drastic elimination of much of the remaining trade barriers 
after the collapse of communism. Considering the elimination of most price controls, and 
the further radical reduction of prices, albeit from a relatively liberalized starting point, 
Hungary is coded as having a Shock Liberalization. 
Hungary, because of government policy in the 1980s, was the one postcommunist 
country without the so-called “monetary overhang” (Amsden, Kochanowicz, and Taylor 
1994: 31). Its ratio of currency and accessible bank deposits (broad money) to GDP in 
1990 was only 0.4 for Hungary, compared with 0.7 in Czechoslovakia and 0.9 in Poland.   60
Considering “[a] typical value in a market economy from 0.2 to 0.5 or more,” Hungary 
was already a fairly stabilized economy (see Amsden, Kochanowicz, and Taylor 1994: 
31, fn.10). Still, the victors of the 1990 election, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (in 
coalition with the Smallholders Party and the Christian Democrats), pursued a neoliberal 
stabilization.  
Stabilization efforts began in 1988-1989, when the government “radically 
reduc[ed] subsidies” (EBRD 1996: 155). The new government introduced a tax on excess 
wages, and there was “tighter access to finance for loss-making enterprises” (EBRD 
1996: 154). The government pursued a “tight monetary policy,” resulting in interest rates 
that were “extremely high (30-35%)” (Lorant 1996: 10).  
  Privatization, unlike in Russia and the Czech Republic, did not take the form of a 
voucher program. Instead, the government’s main method was direct sales for cash. This 
began in March 1990, and “by the end of 1995 control of most of the formerly state-
owned large companies had been transferred to the private sector” (EBRD 1996: 153). 
Indeed, most of this privatization was accomplished by the end of 1993: “In the 
beginning of privatization there were 1848 enterprises with 1940 billion HUF book value 
in the ownership of the State Property Agency. By the year 1994 [there] remained 665 
firms with 253 billion HUF book value” (Lorant 1996: 15). Many of the direct sales were 
to foreigners, which accounts for Hungary’s overwhelming early lead in attracting FDI in 
the transition economies (net inflow was $4,410 million by 1995, out of a total of $9,418 
million in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states) (EBRD 1999: 4). The 
decision of the Hungarian communists to increase travel to, and economic integration 
with, Western Europe from the late 1960s apparently established networks that were   61
subsequently activated by managers of SOEs, accounting for much of this early FDI (see 
case-study data in King 2001a, 2001b). However, it would be a mistake to characterize 
all privatization as taking the form of FDI, as the government also subsidized the sale of 
enterprises to domestic owners through special credits with real negative interest rates 
and the use of management and employee buyouts (EBRD 1999: 32), especially in 1994 
(see Hanley, King, and Toth 2002).  
 
Poland 
Under the first postcommunist Mazowiecki government, the Balcerowicz Plan 
(named after the finance minister) initiated a strong dose of Shock Therapy in the 
beginning of 1990. There was a “drastic reduction of the money supply and the 
establishment of a high interest rate (exceeding inflation in real terms from March 1990)” 
(Balcerowicz, Blaszcyk, and Dabrowski 1998: 138). “State subsidies to enterprises were 
substantially reduced early in the reform programme, falling from 12.9% of GDP in 1989 
to 3.2% in 1992” (EBRD 1996: 165). In addition, wages were controlled by the Popiwek, 
an “excess wage tax for state enterprises, which was operating between 1990 and 1994” 
(EBRD 1996: 166). By January 1990, “banks were permitted freely to set deposit and 
interest rates. The refinancing rate on credits for central investments, which used to be the 
main reference rate, has been replaced by more market-oriented rates …” (EBRD 1996: 
166).  
Liberalization came about very quickly: “Most prices were liberalized in 1990-
1991” (EBRD 1996: 165). Similarly, “[i]n 1990 most tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade 
were suspended or sharply reduced and the state monopoly on foreign trade had ended”   62
(EBRD 1996: 166). Thus, Poland has been celebrated as the showcase of the successful 
application of Shock Therapy. The stabilization and liberalization program, drawn up in 
consultation with the IMF, “was enacted on January 1, 1990” (Balcerowicz, Blaszcyk, 
and Dabrowski 1998: 137). Thus, there is virtually no disagreement that Poland pursued a 
strong stabilization and liberalization program at the beginning of its transition. 
As the pain accompanying Shock Therapy became apparent, a political backlash 
ensued. As a result, in the summer of 1990, “fiscal and monetary policy were 
considerably loosened” (Murrell 1993: 129). State credits again flowed to enterprises, 
and began to “approach … old levels” (Murrell 1993: 129). By the next summer, the 
average tariff went from 5% to 18%, and “selective protection was endorsed” (Murrell 
1993: 129). In addition, the government pursued a wide range of interventions in the 
economy, including vertical and horizontal industrial policy (see Snajder and King 2002). 
Generally, Poland relied on the state, not just the market, to restructure enterprises, and 
actually built more state structures, especially regional economic bureaucracies. 
Employment in public administration more than doubled -- from 69,319 in 1989 to 
171,246 in 1998, and the number of central state agencies increased, from 32 in 1988 to 
55 at the end of 1999 (see Ekiert 2001). 
The third component of Shock Therapy, rapid privatization of large state-owned 
enterprises, was not implemented. While plans for rapid large-scale privatizations had 
been drawn up, they were not enacted, owing to political pressure. “With the election of a 
left-of-center coalition government in 1993, the pace of structural change, particularly 
that of privatization, slowed” (EBRD 1996: 165). Privatization has proceeded mostly in 
small and medium-sized enterprises; by 1995, “Most of the enterprises that changed   63
ownership were small companies employing fewer than 200 employees.” By 1998, the 
situation hadn’t changed dramatically: “Privatization of the largest industrial enterprises 
is proceeding very slowly” (Balcerowicz, Blaszcyk, and Dabrowski 1998: 146, 160). The 
problem was political resistance.  
The Mazowiecki government had a plan for “a quick privatization of the state 
sector” in 1990 (Poznanski 1992: 644), but this plan was not implemented, as public 
dissatisfaction and labor unrest developed. According to Mark Kramer, “growing signs of 
public discontent … helped induce the government to defer its plans for mass 
privatization of large enterprises” (Kramer 1995: 654). Rapid large-scale privatization 
continued to be too risky politically for subsequent governments. Thus, privatization in 
Poland occurred primarily through the growth of new businesses from the ground up: 
“reentry of private ownership … has proceeded mostly through the formation of new 
private businesses” (Poznanski 1996: 279). Since 1996, however, there has been a steady 
increase in the privatization of already restructured SOEs to foreign capital (see King 
2002).  
 
Romania and Bulgaria 
If the experience of central Eastern Europe lends no support to neoliberal theory, 
what about the other relatively large countries of Eastern Europe that were spared the 
trauma of civil and ethnic war? The experiences of the two largest such countries, 
Romania and Bulgaria, also fail to confirm neoliberal expectations.  
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Bulgaria 
Bulgaria started with a healthy dose of Shock Therapy. There was a “sweeping 
liberalization of prices in 1991 … [at the same time as] imports were significantly 
liberalized” (EBRD 1996: 143). However, by 1993 the price liberalization began to be 
partially reversed, in efforts to try to control inflation. Stabilization policies included 
“ceilings on the annual percentage increase in the wage bill of state enterprises…. These 
ceilings have not allowed wages to keep pace with inflation” (EBRD 1996: 143). In 1997, 
a “comprehensive stabilization” program centered on a currency board was introduced 
with the support of the IMF (EBRD 1999: 202).  
  Large-scale privatization, which was formally initiated in 1993, proceeded very 
slowly, “with only 6 per cent of total state enterprise assets privatized by mid-1996” 
(EBRD 1996: 142). After 1996, however, a voucher-based mass privatization program 
“modeled largely on the Czech scheme” was created (EBRD 1996: 142). The first round 
was held in October 1996 and the second round in January 1999. However, by the middle 
of 1999, only a few large enterprise privatizations were completed (EBRD 1999: 202).  
 
Romania 
In Romania, “[r]eforms began in November 1990 with radical price liberalization 
…” (EBRD 1996: 167). This consisted of eliminating half of all administered prices in 
one shot (from 85% to 47%), followed by additional steep reductions over the next two 
years, to 29% and then 20% (EBRD 1999: 256). This price liberalization was matched by 
trade liberalization when “[m]ost licensing requirements for export and import were 
eliminated in May 1992, leaving quantitative import restrictions only for a few products   65
related to public health or safety. There are no duties on exports, and the tariff treatment 
of non-agricultural imports is fairly liberal” (EBRD 1996: 168). Only agriculture remains 
heavily protected. 
  Romania was also already fairly “stabilized” at the beginning of the transition. 
Broad money was 46.9% of GDP in 1991, but this was reduced to 30% in 1992 and 
22.3% in 1993 (EBRD 1999: 257). Thereafter, “[f]rom mid-1993 onwards, a serious 
effort was made to tighten credit policy, and thereby the broad budget constraint facing 
enterprise” (EBRD 1996: 167). 
  Only in privatization was Romania seriously lacking, according to the neoliberal 
criteria. Mass privatization legislation was formally initiated in September 1991 (EBRD 
1999: 254), but this affected mostly small and medium-sized enterprises. In 1996, the 
private sector accounted for only 16% of total employment in industry (EBRD 1996: 
167). However, a “comprehensive scheme of mass privatization was launched in earnest 
in 1995, after having been on the drawing board for years” (EBRD 1996: 167). Thus, 
large-scale privatization commenced in 1995, and out of a total of 3,900 medium-sized to 
large companies slated for privatization, “[b]y March 1996, more than 1,500 companies 
had been privatized” (EBRD 1996: 167).
15 
 
Former Soviet Union 
Belarus 
Of the large states of the European part of the FSU, Belarus performed the best 
(per capita GDP shrank by “only” an average of 0.5% from 1990 to 2000), despite the 
fact that Lukashenka has pursued what is, for the most part, essentially a “neo-Stalinist”   66
transition strategy. The one exception was prices, which were very slowly deregulated 
(the share of administered prices in the Consumer Price Index was 100% in 1990, but fell 
steadily to 27% in 1997 [EBRD 1999: 196]). There has been no progress in foreign-trade 
liberalization and almost no progress on large-scale privatization (although there was a 
very small amount of voucher privatization [EBRD 1999: 194]). 
 
Ukraine 
Ukraine pursued a partial and inconsistent liberalization and austerity package 
until 1994, when a full big-bang approach, including a voucher-based program, was 
launched. By mid-1996, some 3,500 of 8,000 medium-sized and large enterprises had 
been privatized (EBRD 1996: 180).  
 
Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan implemented a “comprehensive reform package” in 1993, complete 
with plans for mass privatization with vouchers (EBRD 1996: 156). This privatization 
took place starting at the end of 1994, and by early 1996 “60 percent of the total equity of 
1,700 large enterprises had been transferred into private hands …” (EBRD 1996: 156).  
 
Uzbekistan  
After an initial radical liberalization of consumer prices in January 1992, policy 
was reversed and “a rationing system was introduced for a wide range of goods” (EBRD 
1996: 183). Prices were gradually liberalized throughout 1994 and 1995, with some key 
goods still regulated by the government. Trade reform was very tentative until early   67
1994, when some liberalization occurred, although by 1996 export tariffs existed for 72 
product groups, and range up to 100%. In addition, as of 1996, “the bulk of trade is still 
channeled through state-owned foreign trade companies” (EBRD 1996: 183). Finally, 
“restrictive trade practices” were reintroduced in 1997.  
Uzbekistan was similarly cautious with privatization, so that by 1999 “[t]he state 
remains the dominant owner in most industrial companies” (EBRD 1999: 282). However, 
small-scale privatization was extensive, and the state strongly promotes the small and 
medium enterprise sector (SMEs). Indeed, privatization revenues are used to fund the 
SME sector (EBRD 1999: 283). Thus, the state moved significantly beyond the “invisible 
hands” model proposed by the neoliberals.  
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1 Please direct all comments to the author at lawrence.king@yale.edu. I would like to thank 
Ivan Szelenyi, Charles Perrow, Andrew Schrank, Marcus Kurtz, Hannah Breukner, Jeff 
Miley, Casiano Hacker-Cordon, Valarie Bunce, and William King, for helpful comments 
on various drafts of this paper. 
2 Neoclassical assumptions are not only compatible with the anti-statist neoliberal 
agenda, as various market socialist schemes advocate combining markets with state 
ownership attest to (see Szelenyi, Beckett, and King 1994). The neoclassical sociological 
alternative, however, differs from the neoclassical economic theory on these core 
assumptions. Rather than actors without systematic information deficiencies making 
rational calculations, actors are seen as having bounded rationality and often very limited 
information. Rather than being “rational” in the economic sense of the term (utility 
maximizing with stable preferences), it is more accurate to say they have interests. 
Similarly, rather than a world of atomized individuals, in the sociological conception 
people only exist in various social relationships. That is, they are embedded in networks 
that aggregate to social structures (Granovetter 1985). As a result, the economy is 
characterized as people with network connections that provide unequal amounts of social 
power and information competing with each other (see King 2001a, 2001c (book 
chapter)). 
3 Of course, foreign direct investment can have quite deleterious effects. Elsewhere, I 
identify eight ways such investment leads to negative outcomes, and ten ways such 
investment leads to positive outcomes (King and Varadi 2002). On balance, however, the 
positive effects far outweigh the negative ones, at least in Hungary.    69
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Of course, MNCs can “articulate” with pre-capitalist property forms by employing non-
free wage labor – in which case such investment will not produce a developmental 
dynamic (see Baran 1957).  
5 I present case study evidence from 25 Russian firms and 23 Polish firms that lend 
support to these arguments elsewhere (King 2002, 2003).  
6 There is unfortunately reason to believe that these measurements based on perception 
suffer from a serious selection bias. In non-bureaucratic systems, existing firms are likely 
to have personal connections to administrative elites, and might therefore not view these 
“cronyistic” elements as problematic. In more bureaucratic systems, non-connected firms 
are more likely to exist, and might therefore report that cronyism is a bigger problem. 
Only panel data would solve this problem.  
7 This lack of data, even of estimates, is puzzling. In many cases the IMF was intimately 
involved in vetting budgetary decisions, and thus must have had access to at least some 
estimate of revenues.  
8 The non-bureaucratic nature of the state results in its near abdication of enforcing 
contracts and protecting property rights. The regular assassination of members of the 
Russian government because of their “business connections” is a well known fact (NYT 
2002). Similarly, the media mogul/banker/oligarch Guisinsky needed a private security 
force of about 1,000 men, possibly more (Klebnikov 2000: 151). Similarly, in Siberia, 
there were “shooting wars” over the control of aluminum companies, giving a 
patrimonial twist to “corporate takeovers.” 
9 However, all three states remain heavily dependent on the export of raw materials from 
Russia.    70
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Most FDI will depend on a host of other conditions, such as geographical proximity to 
advanced capitalist economies, the existence of an expatriate diaspora with capital willing 
to invest in the home country, personal contacts linking Western capital with local 
managers, the size of the local market, its valuable natural resources, its infrastructure, its 
human capital base (including language capacity), its wage levels, the general business 
climate and perhaps its cultural similarity to the country of the potential investor (see 
Nina Bandelj 2001). The fact that increasingly FDI-friendly policies throughout the 
developing world in the 1980s and 1990s have not led to significantly elevated levels of 
FDI (excluding China – which does not even have capital account convertability) should 
caution against placing too much hope on pro-FDI policy as a means of securing FDI 
flows. It is probable that anti-FDI policies can be very effective in keeping (or pushing) 
FDI out, but pro-FDI policies are very ineffective in pulling FDI in (See Chang 1998: 
110). 
11 Romania, according to my coding, is clearly more neoliberal than Bulgaria because it 
actually implemented a significant mass privatization program. However, according to 
EBRD reports, Romania’s program was the closest to the cut-off point of 25% (the next 
biggest was Poland’s program implemented in 1995 which covered mostly medium sized 
firms that constituted 10% of the assets of SOEs) [Baltowski and Michanowicz 2000]. 
Furthermore, as indicated in the historical summaries in Appendix 1, Bulgaria’s initial 
liberalization appears to be even quicker than Romania’s. Thus, Bulgaria and Romania 
are very close in terms of overall adherence to Shock Therapy.  
12 It should be noted that these levels are still significantly above the levels in China and 
Vietnam on a per capita basis.    71
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Sachs uses the term “the developing world” but he clearly means developed (see 
Gowan 1995:8), or else how would they narrow the gap with the West? It is also clear 
from the context of the passage. If he meant that postcommunist countries would attain 
rates of growth that were higher than African countries’, for example, Shock Therapy 
would have never been compelling to anyone in the East or the West.  
14 “The EBRD seeks to foster the transition to an open market-oriented economy and 
promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in all 26 of its countries of operation. It 
does this as a participant investor with a private sector focus” (EBRD 1999: iv).  
15 For 1996, Romania received a score of 3 on the EBRD’s and World Bank’s four-point 
scale for large- scale privatization. A 3 indicates “More than 25 percent of large-scale 
enterprise assets in private hands or in the process of being privatized (with the process 
having reached a stage at which the state has effectively ceded its ownership rights), but 
possibly with major unresolved issues regarding corporate governance” (EBRD 1999: 
25). Without an explanation, this score was lowered to 2.7 for both 1997 and 1998 
(EBRD 1999: 256). At any rate, almost 40% of medium-sized and large enterprises were 
privatized, representing around 25% of total assets.   
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